A Brick Doesn’t Know Which Building It’s Holding Up

An essay on compartmentalization

This essay describes an architecture. The people inside the architecture are its inhabitants. When the essay names what a pediatrician does not see, or what an FDA reviewer does not need to see, the target is the compartment each was trained into and paid to occupy, and the architecture that produced the compartments. The bricks are described. The building is what the essay reveals.

The reader will encounter establishment terminology in this essay because the architecture uses that terminology. Phrases like “immune response,” “antibody titer,” and “immunogenicity” appear in the voice of the compartments that use them, in quotation, or inside the titles of documents the compartments produce. The essay’s own analytical voice operates from the terrain paradigm. The two registers do different work. Establishment vocabulary describes what the compartments say and do. The terrain vocabulary describes what is happening to the child on the table.

The essay is about the mechanism by which a system produces vast harm with no one to hold to account. It is not about whether the products the system produces are harmful, which the corpus establishes elsewhere in essays including The Architecture of Deception, The Guards Who Love You, and Below the Line of Consent. The mechanism is the subject. The mechanism operates regardless of the specific harm the system happens to be producing.

The greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is any where directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter I, 1776

Tuesday Morning

At eight thirty on a Tuesday morning in September, a pediatrician enters the examining room where a two-month-old boy named James is sitting on his mother’s lap. The refrigerator was checked at eight, its temperature logged per protocol. The printed immunization schedule is taped to the wall, updated in January after the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices added a new formulation of one of the products.¹

The pediatrician performs the physical examination: weight, head circumference, reflexes, hip abduction, heart, lungs. Everything is normal.

She turns to the schedule on the wall and reads through the day’s vaccinations. DTaP. Hib. IPV. PCV13. Rotavirus by mouth. The second dose of hepatitis B. The mother asks whether the schedule has changed recently. The pediatrician answers from the continuing medical education module she completed in July. The mother nods and signs the vaccine information statement that federal law requires the pediatrician to offer.

The nurse enters with the syringes drawn up in the order the schedule specifies and swabs each thigh with alcohol. The pediatrician gives the first injection. James’s face changes before the sound reaches his mouth. Three more injections follow, one after another, and then the oral dose. His mother holds him and murmurs. The nurse writes each lot number in the record.

The pediatrician documents the visit, prints the after-visit summary, and moves to the next appointment. It is eight forty-seven in the morning.

By the end of the day the pediatrician will have seen twenty-two children. She will have administered vaccines to eighteen of them. Every visit will have been competent and delivered in accordance with the schedule that the ACIP recommends and the CDC publishes. She will have done her job well.

She is one brick. The essay is about the building.

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The Pediatrician

She trained at a good medical school and completed a three-year pediatric residency at a teaching hospital. Across those seven years she received substantial instruction in vaccinology from a specific direction. She learned the schedule, the mechanisms the textbooks describe, and the narrative that vaccines account for the disappearance of once-common childhood illnesses. She did not receive substantial instruction in the history of vaccine adverse events, in the design of pre-licensure trials, in the pharmacoepidemiology of the current schedule, or in the legal architecture of vaccine liability. Those topics were not on the boards or in the curriculum. If they came up at all, they came up as fringe concerns held by parents she would need to be trained to reassure.

Her continuing medical education is provided by educators whose funding is substantially pharmaceutical. The specific proportion is difficult to isolate because CME sponsorship reaches educators through multiple channels, but the direction is not in doubt. When she takes the CME modules required to maintain her license, the content is compliant with the current schedule. Content that would raise structural questions about the schedule does not exist in the format her licensing board accepts.

Her practice is governed by the guidelines of the American Academy of Pediatrics. Those guidelines rest on the ACIP recommendations. Her insurance reimbursement is tied in part to her vaccine coverage rates through quality metrics such as HEDIS, and, in employed settings, through the productivity measures her group applies. Her state’s school entry requirements track the ACIP schedule. If she diverges from the schedule she owns the risk. If she follows the schedule the risk sits elsewhere in the building.

When a child in her practice has what the parents describe as a reaction to a vaccination, she has three options. She can attribute the reaction to the vaccine and file a report with the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System. She can attribute it to something else, most often a coincidence of timing, and not file. Or she can leave the question open and refer the child to a specialist whose compartment sits elsewhere. VAERS is a passive system. Its own literature acknowledges that reports capture a small fraction of the events that would qualify. No epidemiologist has ever analyzed her patient panel’s outcomes across the full course of the schedule. No one has. That analysis is not part of anyone’s compartment.

She has heard of the 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, and understands it created a compensation program for families of injured children. What the wider public tends not to know, and what her own training rarely explains, is that the same Act, and the Supreme Court’s 2011 interpretation of it in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, means that if a child in her care is injured by a vaccine, the manufacturer of that vaccine cannot be sued in state court under any theory of design defect.² She, the pediatrician, is the last person in the chain of the product’s journey to the child with any residual exposure to state-law tort liability. If she administered the vaccine per schedule and per current medical practice, that exposure too is largely closed.

She is a good doctor who has done what she was trained to do, followed the guidelines the specialty society issues, and administered the schedule the ACIP recommends. She is telling the truth when she says she did not know. She does not have access, inside her compartment, to the information that would allow her to know. This is what a brick looks like when the brick is doing exactly what a brick is supposed to do.

The Committee Member

The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices consists of up to nineteen voting members appointed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, with fifteen serving through most of its recent history.³ Members serve overlapping terms of up to four years. The committee has typically met three times per year in public session. When ACIP votes to recommend a vaccine for the routine childhood or adult schedule, and the CDC director signs the recommendation, several things happen at once. Insurers become obligated under the Affordable Care Act to cover the vaccine without cost sharing. States generally update their school entry requirements to match. The Vaccines for Children program, which provides free vaccines to uninsured and Medicaid-enrolled children, adds the vaccine to its formulary. The recommendation becomes standard of medical care.

The committee member votes on the record. Before the vote, the member has attended a series of working group meetings, some of which are not public. In the working group the substantive preparation happens: review of the manufacturer’s submission, the pre-licensure trial data, the CDC’s surveillance data, and the cost-effectiveness analysis. When the recommendation reaches the full committee for the public vote, the analytical work is essentially complete.

The committee member has disclosed their financial interests. Members with direct financial ties to a specific product are required to recuse from votes on that product. Members without direct ties vote. The disclosure requirements do not change the shape of the information the members receive. Presentations come from the manufacturer’s regulatory affairs staff, from the FDA, from CDC epidemiologists whose work is funded through the same public health system that has already decided that vaccination is the principal tool. The trials cited are the trials the manufacturer conducted, published in journals whose editorial boards include committee members’ colleagues.

The compartment does not include the following functions. The committee does not commission independent trials, does not follow long-term outcomes in children exposed to the schedule, and does not compare aggregate health outcomes in populations receiving the full schedule against populations receiving no vaccines or a reduced schedule. Those comparisons are not part of the committee’s charge, which is to vote on the specific recommendation before it, on the evidence the process has produced.

Paul Offit served on ACIP from 1998 to 2003. During his service he co-invented the rotavirus vaccine that Merck later licensed and brought to market in 2006 as RotaTeq. His institution, the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, sold its royalty interest to Royalty Pharma in 2008 for $182 million.⁴ Offit has stated that his personal share was in the millions. He recused from votes on rotavirus vaccination during his tenure but voted on other vaccines. This is not concealed. It is on the record. The compartment does not prohibit financial interests. It requires their disclosure. The distinction matters.

When the committee member votes yes on adding a new vaccine to the childhood schedule, the vote is honest. The member has reviewed the materials the process placed in front of them, and the evidence base as presented met the standards the process applies. The vote responds to what the compartment shows. What lies outside the compartment’s field of view is information the compartment does not require the member to seek.

The vote is recorded, the CDC director signs, and the schedule updates. The pediatrician in September, looking at the wall of her examining room, reads a schedule that has passed through this compartment.

The FDA Reviewer

Vaccines are reviewed by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, the FDA division that handles biological products. The reviewer receives a Biologics License Application containing the manufacturer’s submission on chemistry, manufacturing, controls, and clinical trial data. The reviewer’s job is to evaluate whether the submission meets the technical and regulatory requirements for licensure. The reviewer is not empowered to conduct independent testing on the product or to run independent trials, and is not staffed or funded to audit the manufacturer’s raw data except by exception.

The user fee structure that funds a large share of the FDA’s medical product review budget was created by the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 and expanded by parallel legislation for biologics and generics.⁵ The reviewer’s compartment is funded, in significant part, by the entities whose applications the reviewer reviews. Whether this creates conscious bias is contested. That it creates a structural condition of professional dependency is a matter of budget arithmetic, not opinion.

The reviewer approves the product based on the trial data as submitted. The primary efficacy endpoint for most childhood vaccines is what the trial protocol calls “immunogenicity,” measured by changes in what the assay identifies as antibody titer against the target antigen. Whether that laboratory measurement translates into real-world protection against clinical illness is often not directly demonstrated in the pre-licensure trials. It is inferred from the assay.

The safety data cover the follow-up period the protocol specified. That period is typically weeks. Serious adverse events are counted per the definition in the protocol.

In 2018 the Informed Consent Action Network filed a Freedom of Information Act request seeking documentation of pre-licensure safety trials for childhood vaccines. The Department of Health and Human Services responded that it could not produce documentation of clinical trials for many licensed childhood vaccines that had used a saline placebo as the comparator arm.⁶ Most of the trials had used another vaccine, an adjuvant-containing formulation, or a non-inert substance as the comparator. When the comparator itself may cause adverse events, the safety signal from the trial’s active arm is attenuated. This was not the reviewer’s decision. The trial design was set upstream, by the manufacturer, and accepted by the compartment before the reviewer received it.

Post-market safety monitoring sits in a different compartment. The reviewer approving the license does not sit at VAERS, does not perform pharmacoepidemiology on the schedule, and finishes at approval. The next compartment begins at surveillance, and the two do not routinely communicate at the level of the individual reviewer.

The reviewer’s career, if the reviewer eventually leaves the agency, often continues at one of the companies whose products the reviewer once reviewed. This is not universal, but it is common enough to have a name. A 2016 study in the British Medical Journal tracked the fifty-five FDA hematology-oncology reviewers who worked in that division from 2001 through 2010; of the twenty-six who left the agency during that period, fifteen went on to work or consult for the biopharmaceutical industry.⁷ The revolving door has been studied. It has not been closed.

The reviewer’s compartment produces the approval letter. The letter names the product, the indication, and the population. It does not require the reviewer to have seen what the product will do to the child sixty years from now, or to have compared aggregate outcomes across a schedule the reviewer’s compartment did not design. It requires the reviewer to have done the job the compartment defines. The reviewer, in most cases, has done exactly that.

The approval letter goes into the manufacturer’s file. The product moves to the ACIP for consideration, and from there onto the schedule.

The Trial Investigator

The clinical trial investigator is typically a physician or physician-scientist based at an academic medical center, a private clinical research site, or a contract research organization. The investigator receives a protocol prepared by the manufacturer or the manufacturer’s CRO. The protocol specifies who is eligible for the trial, what the intervention is, what the comparator is, what the primary endpoint is, how long the follow-up runs, what constitutes a serious adverse event, and how the data will be analyzed. The investigator is not the author of the protocol. The investigator executes the protocol as designed.

The protocol’s exclusion criteria typically screen out participants who have had prior adverse reactions to any vaccine, participants with certain pre-existing conditions, participants outside the specified age range, and, historically, pregnant women. The population enrolled in the pre-licensure trial is by design a healthier and more homogeneous population than the one that will receive the product once it is licensed and added to the schedule. This is not concealed. It is a standard feature of the trial design that both manufacturer and regulator understand and accept.

The follow-up period for safety observation in most childhood vaccine trials is short by the standards of pharmacoepidemiology. Weeks, sometimes months. The comparator is often not an inert placebo. The trial’s ability to detect a signal for chronic conditions that emerge years after exposure is close to zero by design.

The investigator sees the participants in the trial. The investigator does not see the participants excluded from the trial. The investigator does not see the participants after the trial ends and the follow-up period closes. The investigator does not run the meta-analyses across trials. The investigator writes up the results per the pre-specified statistical plan, submits the manuscript through the collaboration structure the protocol defines, and moves to the next protocol.

What happens to a site director who steps outside the protocol is illustrated by the case of Brook Jackson. In September 2020 Jackson was hired as a regional director at Ventavia Research Group, one of the contract research sites conducting the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine trial. Within about two weeks she had documented what she believed were serious data integrity and oversight failures at the sites she supervised: unblinding of participants, delayed follow-up on adverse events, mislabeled specimens, vaccines not stored at proper temperatures, and inadequate monitoring of participants after injection. She raised her concerns internally. When they were not addressed, she emailed a formal complaint to the FDA on September 25, 2020. Ventavia fired her the same day. The FDA did not inspect Ventavia’s sites during the remainder of the pivotal trial period. Jackson’s account was published in the British Medical Journal in November 2021 under the byline of the journalist Paul Thacker.⁸ It received a “partly false” rating from the platform fact-checkers.

The investigator’s compartment does not require the investigator to see what happens at other sites in the same trial or to see the raw data submitted to the sponsor and later to the regulator. It requires the investigator to run the protocol at the assigned site and to report what the protocol required. What the compartment produces is the trial the sponsor commissioned, in the shape the protocol specified. Independent judgment about the product’s safety in the real-world population that will receive it is not among its outputs. That judgment is not in the investigator’s compartment. The reader will notice, by now, that it has not been in any compartment the essay has described.

The Manufacturer

The compartment of the pharmaceutical manufacturer that produces childhood vaccines is defined by an operating condition that no other pharmaceutical product enjoys in the United States. Since 1986, under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, the manufacturer of a vaccine included in the routine childhood schedule cannot be sued in state court under any theory of tort liability for injury or death arising from the administration of the vaccine.⁹ Design defect claims, failure to warn claims, and negligent manufacturing claims that would proceed against any other pharmaceutical or medical device product are, in the vaccine case, foreclosed. Federal law provides a compensation program, the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, as the exclusive remedy. In 2011 the Supreme Court affirmed this arrangement in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, holding that the design defect cause of action against a covered vaccine’s manufacturer is preempted by federal law.²

The economic effects of this operating condition are structural. The manufacturer produces the product per the FDA specification. The manufacturer defends the product in the VICP compensation proceedings, which are non-adversarial by design and closed to the discovery mechanisms of ordinary civil litigation. The proceedings are paid out of a trust fund financed by an excise tax of seventy-five cents per dose per disease the vaccine targets, so that a combination product like the diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine carries an excise tax of $2.25 for each dose administered.¹⁰ That tax is passed to the consumer or the payer, meaning that families and insurers fund the compensation for injuries the manufacturer is not required to defend against in adversarial proceedings.

As of the January 2026 HRSA reporting, the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program has paid out approximately $5.5 billion in compensation to petitioners since its inception in 1988.¹¹ The dollar figure understates the injury total, because the program’s eligibility criteria are narrow, its statute of limitations short, its process opaque to petitioners without specialized counsel, and its outcomes uncertain. Many families whose children experienced adverse events after vaccination never file. Many who file are dismissed on procedural grounds. The program exists and functions. It does not create the accountability that ordinary tort law creates.

In the early 1980s, before the shield was enacted, the recommended childhood schedule included roughly two dozen doses of three vaccines protecting against seven illnesses through age eighteen.¹² By 2024, the routine schedule spanned seventeen distinct vaccines and, counting each dose separately, on the order of seventy doses through age eighteen.¹ The expansion of the schedule since 1986 tracks the operating condition the shield created. Each new vaccine added to the schedule opens a revenue stream. Each new vaccine added carries no exposure to the tort liability that would attach to any other pharmaceutical product marketed to healthy children.

The manufacturer’s compartment does not require the manufacturer to demonstrate real-world safety across the aggregate schedule. What it requires is production of an approved product per specification, fulfillment of the post-marketing reporting requirements the FDA specifies, and defense of the product in compensation proceedings when families succeed in bringing them. The manufacturer’s shareholders receive a return on a product line that operates under a liability structure available for no other product category.

The manufacturer is telling the truth when saying the product is approved by the FDA and administered per the schedule the ACIP recommends, and when saying the compensation program exists for families of the injured. The manufacturer is not required, and does not typically choose, to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the compensation program exists because the ordinary accountability system was removed from this product category in 1986, and that no other pharmaceutical product for healthy children is manufactured under this arrangement. That is the compartment, defined by a statute that has a history. The history is the next brick.

The Legislator

The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 passed the United States Congress in the final weeks of the ninety-ninth Congress. In the House the primary mover was Representative Henry Waxman of California. In the Senate the bill moved through the Labor and Human Resources Committee. President Ronald Reagan signed it on November 14, 1986. Reagan attached a signing statement expressing reservations about the liability provisions, which he characterized as more expansive than the administration had preferred, but he signed.⁹

The testimony that produced the vote was structured around a specific framing. Manufacturers of vaccines, particularly the diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine, were said to be facing what industry witnesses described as an existential litigation crisis. Jury verdicts in DPT injury cases in the early 1980s had reached figures the manufacturers stated they could not sustain. Wyeth Laboratories and Connaught Laboratories both exited the DPT market in 1984, each citing an inability to obtain affordable product liability insurance.¹³ Lederle Laboratories, which remained as the sole major domestic producer, subsequently signaled that it too was under pressure. The framing was that vaccine supply for American children was at risk. The remedy proposed was a compensation program funded by an excise tax, with immunity for manufacturers from state tort claims in exchange for the compensation program’s existence.

Parents of vaccine-injured children, represented most visibly by Barbara Loe Fisher of the group later known as the National Vaccine Information Center, had lobbied for greater accountability, better safety monitoring, and improved parental notification. What emerged from the legislative process was a compromise: the compensation program was created, the manufacturers received the shield, and the Vaccine Information Statements and VAERS reporting requirements were imposed on the medical practice compartment. Barbara Loe Fisher and other parent advocates have spent the four decades since the Act’s passage documenting what they see as its progressive tilting toward the manufacturer’s protection and away from the family’s remedy.

The legislator in 1986 saw the specific vote in front of them and the industry witnesses, parent witnesses, public health officials, and state medical society representatives who came to the hearings. The legislator did not see the trajectory the shield would produce over the following forty years: the schedule expanding from roughly two dozen doses to over seventy, and the Supreme Court’s 2011 interpretation in Bruesewitz closing the design defect cause of action entirely.

Subsequent legislators, encountering similar bills over the following four decades, saw similar specific votes. The 2005 Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act extended immunity, in the event of a declared public health emergency, to a broader class of medical countermeasures.¹⁴ The Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program was established as the compensation vehicle for products deployed under the PREP Act’s protection.¹⁵ The CICP’s eligibility criteria are narrower than the VICP’s, its awards are smaller, and fewer categories of injury qualify at all. When the emergency use authorization framework was invoked in 2020 and 2021 for COVID-19 countermeasures, the PREP Act shield applied, and injuries from those products became subject to the CICP process rather than the ordinary tort system or even the VICP process.

No legislator, in any of the votes that extended the compartment across four decades, has proposed the repeal of the 1986 Act. The compartment of the legislator, session by session, was the specific bill on the floor and the votes required to pass it. Individually, each vote was cast on evidence the process supplied. Collectively, the votes have produced an architecture that no single vote authored and that no single legislator has been asked to hold in mind as a whole.

The Journalist and the Fact-Checker

The reader who has walked through six compartments and encountered no established newspaper or broadcast network describing any of this as an integrated whole is by now asking a question. The question is why. The seventh brick is the answer.

The journalist covering health for a major American news outlet operates in a compartment that determines what stories can be reported and how. The beat structure assigns particular reporters to particular institutions: the CDC beat, the FDA beat, the NIH beat, the industry earnings beat. Sources of authority for stories on that beat are the officials of those institutions. Contrary voices are typically included, when they are included, as “skeptics” or “critics” of the mainstream position, positioned rhetorically as the opposing team in a two-sided debate whose sides the outlet has already defined.

Access to sources is a professional currency. A reporter who alienates the CDC’s communications office loses the ability to get comment on breaking stories, invitations to embargoed briefings, and the interviews that make the reporter’s byline valuable. A reporter who publishes a story that the CDC subsequently characterizes as misleading is subject to internal editorial review. Careers depend on continued access. The mechanism operates without any editor spiking a story; reporters internalize the incentive structure their careers depend on, and the outcome follows.

Advertising is another compartment wall. In August 1997 the FDA issued draft guidance easing the disclosure requirements for broadcast direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertising in the United States, and the guidance was finalized in 1999.¹⁶ Pharmaceutical companies subsequently became among the largest categories of American advertising spending, especially on cable television during evening programming. Again the mechanism operates without explicit direction; the business office understands which advertisers are large and repeat, and the effect on story selection follows.

Sharyl Attkisson, a longtime investigative reporter at CBS News, produced reporting on vaccine safety among other subjects in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Her departure from the network in 2014 and her subsequent published account of internal editorial pressures on her reporting is one of the more publicly documented cases, though not the only one.¹⁷

The fact-checker’s compartment is newer and more explicitly enforceable at machine speed. Beginning in December 2016, Meta and other major social media platforms entered into partnerships with third-party fact-checking organizations, most of them certified by the Poynter Institute’s International Fact-Checking Network. When a post on such a platform was rated false or misleading by a fact-checker, the platform’s algorithm reduced the post’s distribution, appended warning labels, and, in some cases, removed the post entirely. In January 2025 Meta announced the end of its United States third-party fact-checking program. The mechanism shaped what could be seen on the largest social platforms for the eight years the program operated.

The fact-checker’s methodology, published on the fact-checker’s own website, is to compare the claim against the guidance of the recognized public health authorities: the WHO, the CDC, the FDA, and their national equivalents. A claim that contradicts those authorities is rated false or misleading. This is not the fact-checker doing anything other than what the fact-checker’s compartment defines as fact-checking. The compartment defines fact as consistency with the authority. The fact-checker follows the definition.

Specific claims rated false by major fact-checkers in 2020 and 2021, and later acknowledged by the same authorities as reasonable or accurate, include the possibility that what the establishment identifies as SARS-CoV-2 originated in a laboratory in Wuhan, the observation that prior exposure produced protective effects comparable to those claimed for vaccination, and the claim that the mRNA products did not prevent onward spread of the illness. The fact-checks were not always retracted. Many remain online, timestamped from the period when they contradicted the emerging record.

The disclosures produced by the release of internal Twitter communications in late 2022 and 2023, published on Substack by Matt Taibbi, Michael Shellenberger, and Bari Weiss, documented systematic communication between federal agencies and platform moderation teams regarding what content should be flagged or removed.¹⁸ The compartment of the platform moderator and the compartment of the federal official were, in some cases, in direct communication about specific accounts and specific posts.

The journalist follows the beat and the fact-checker follows the authorities. Neither sees the whole. Between them, the reader is prevented from encountering any of the previous six compartments described as an integrated architecture. The reader is left to assemble the picture privately, from primary sources and independent voices, or to accept the picture the compartment permits.

The Defense

A defender of this architecture would say that specialization is what makes any complex system function, and that the compartments the essay describes are just the ordinary shape of expertise. The people inside the compartments are not villains. Most of them sincerely believe they are protecting the public, and by the standards of their compartment they are. The defense is coherent as far as it goes.

What the defense does not answer is why, in this specific case, the ordinary check on specialization has been removed by federal statute. In every other industry, that check is an injured party’s ability to hold a manufacturer accountable in court under state tort law. Verdicts against unsafe products cost the shareholders money and the executives their jobs, and the compartments recalibrate accordingly, whether or not any individual inside them can see the whole. Tort law is the mechanism by which the compartments of a complex system stay tethered to the outcomes they produce.

The 1986 Act cut that tether for vaccines. The compartments continue to function, but the outcomes they produce no longer feed back into the shape of the compartments. Every specialized industry has compartments. Only this one has been untethered.

The Pattern in Earlier Cases

The mechanism the essay has described was not invented by the modern American medical system. It has been named before, in earlier arrangements, in cases the reader can verify through primary documents and independent scholarship. Four cases across two hundred and fifty years illustrate the continuity.

The Pin Factory, 1776

Adam Smith opened The Wealth of Nations with the pin factory. The passage is famous in economics and is rarely read for what else it demonstrates. Smith described ten men, each performing a single operation on a pin: one drew the wire, another straightened it, a third cut it, a fourth pointed it, a fifth ground it at the top to receive the head, and so on through eighteen distinct operations. The men working together in this arrangement produced upward of forty-eight thousand pins per day. Any one of them, working alone through all the operations, could scarcely have made twenty.¹⁹ Smith called this “the greatest improvement in the productive powers of labour.”

Smith was not naive about what the arrangement did to the men. Elsewhere in the same book he wrote about the torpor of the mind produced by repetitive tasks and worried, in Book V, about the effect of the division of labor on civic virtue. He did not, however, connect the division of labor to the dispersal of moral responsibility. The pin factory produces pins efficiently. The same architecture, applied to a factory that produces harm, produces harm efficiently and disperses the responsibility for the harm across ten workers, none of whom made the pin. Smith saw the productivity. He did not name the accountability the arrangement would foreclose. The mechanism was celebrated at its founding and its shadow was left for later.

The Radium Girls, 1917 to 1938

The United States Radium Corporation, and its successor the Radium Dial Company of Ottawa, Illinois, hired young women to paint luminous dials on watches and clocks. The paint contained radium. The technique the workers were taught was “lip-pointing,” in which the brush was drawn between the lips to bring the bristles to a fine point. The workers ingested small quantities of radium with each dial they painted. Radium is a bone-seeking radionuclide. The women developed necrosis of the jaw, anemia, sarcomas, and the specific radiation injuries that the physicians who eventually examined them described in detail.²⁰

The compartments held. Executives at the corporations knew, by internal correspondence dated to the late 1910s, that radium was a hazardous substance. The company physician at U.S. Radium filed reports declaring the workers healthy. Independent dentists and physicians who examined the women found the jaw necrosis, and their findings were disputed or suppressed by the companies. The industrial hygienist Alice Hamilton, writing in the 1920s and 1930s, documented what she was told and what she observed.²¹ Grace Fryer and four other dying women filed suit against U.S. Radium in 1927; the case reached settlement in June 1928 without any admission of fault. The Ottawa cases continued through the 1930s. Company executives, physicians, foremen, insurers, courts: each compartment did what its compartment defined. The women died over the succeeding decades. Kate Moore’s The Radium Girls documents the compartmentalization in the words of the participants and the surviving records.²⁰

Tuskegee, 1932 to 1972

The United States Public Health Service enrolled approximately four hundred impoverished African American men in Macon County, Alabama, in a study of untreated syphilis. The men were told they were being treated for “bad blood.” They were not treated. When penicillin became the standard treatment for syphilis in 1947, the study continued and the men were not offered penicillin. The study ran for forty years.²²

The compartments that sustained the study were numerous. Public Health Service physicians conducted the initial recruitment and follow-up. Nurse Eunice Rivers served as the study’s liaison to the community for its entire duration. Journal editors at the Journal of Chronic Diseases, the Journal of the National Medical Association, and other periodicals published the study’s findings throughout its history. Successive PHS officers reviewed and continued the study through changes in administration. The compartments held for forty years.

Peter Buxtun, a PHS venereal disease investigator based in San Francisco, wrote his first letter of concern to the CDC in November 1966. He was summoned to Atlanta in 1967 and rebuked. He left the Public Health Service and went to law school, but the study continued. In 1972 he gave the documents to a friend at the Associated Press; Jean Heller’s story ran on July 25, and the study ended within months. In 1979 the Belmont Report was issued, laying out the ethical framework for research on human subjects that had been visibly absent in the Tuskegee case for four decades.²³ A federal apology was issued in 1997. No PHS official was prosecuted. James Jones’s Bad Blood documents the compartments.²²

The Manhattan Project, 1942 to 1946

General Leslie Groves, the Army officer who directed the Manhattan Project, designed its compartmentalization explicitly. Workers at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in the Y-12 and K-25 facilities, operated equipment they had been trained to operate. They did not know the equipment was enriching uranium. Workers at Hanford, Washington, operated equipment producing plutonium. They did not know it was plutonium. Even at Los Alamos, where the physicists knew the objective, information was compartmented by need to know: scientists working on one aspect of the device design were not told what was being worked on by scientists elsewhere in the same laboratory.²⁴

Most participants in the Manhattan Project learned what they had built when they heard the radio announcement of the destruction of Hiroshima. Richard Feynman’s account of realizing during his time at Los Alamos what the project was for, and of his response after the war to what he had participated in, is one of many.²⁵ Richard Rhodes’s The Making of the Atomic Bomb documents Groves’s explicit design and its consequences.²⁴ The compartmentalization was rationalized as security. Its effect was moral: no participant, at almost any level of the project, was required to hold the whole in mind. The device was assembled by hands that saw only their hands’ work.

The Room

The room is in the present. A family sits at a table. On the other side of the table are seven voices. The voices speak in turn.

The pediatrician says: I administered the vaccinations the schedule recommends. The schedule was current. The technique was correct. The lot numbers are documented in the chart. I offered the vaccine information statement that federal law requires me to offer. I answered your questions from my training.

The committee member says: I voted on the recommendation based on the manufacturer’s presentation, the FDA’s approval, and the CDC’s surveillance data. The evidence base met the standards our working group applies. My financial disclosures are on file. My vote is in the public record.

The FDA reviewer says: I approved the product based on the trial data the manufacturer submitted. The submission met the technical and regulatory requirements. The endpoints were the endpoints the protocol specified. The approval was signed by the officials authorized to sign it.

The trial investigator says: I ran the protocol as designed. The endpoints I measured were the endpoints the protocol required. The follow-up period I observed was the follow-up period the protocol specified. The paper was reviewed by my co-authors and the journal.

The manufacturer says: I produced the product per FDA specification. I am indemnified under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 for injury claims arising from the administration of the vaccine. Compensation is available through the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program administered by the Department of Health and Human Services.

The legislator says: I voted for the 1986 Act based on testimony that the manufacturers required liability protection to continue supplying vaccines to American children. The Act created a compensation program funded by an excise tax. My vote is recorded. Subsequent legislation extending similar protections was passed based on similar reasoning.

The journalist and the fact-checker say: I reported what the FDA and the CDC announced. I checked claims against the guidance issued by the recognized public health authorities. The stories I filed passed editorial review. The ratings I applied followed my organization’s published methodology.

Each voice is true, each participant telling the truth about what they did and did not do, each compartment intact. None of them answers the question the family came to have answered.

The child is in the room. The essay does not need to describe him.

The building stands because the bricks hold it up. The bricks do not know they are holding up a building. If they did, some of them would leave the wall, and the building would fall. The design was celebrated by Adam Smith in 1776. Two centuries of industrial and scientific practice have installed it in the office where the schedule is on the wall.

The child was not there when the design was made. Now he sits at the table while the voices speak. No one is responsible.

How to Explain It to a Six-Year-Old

Imagine a very tall tower made of a thousand bricks. Each brick is a person doing one small job. The person at the bottom of the tower does not know the person at the top. The person at the top does not know the person at the bottom. Each of them just does their small part.

Now imagine the tower is not a good tower. Somebody gets hurt because of it. A child, maybe. The family of that child wants to know who built the tower. They want to know whose fault it is.

They walk to every brick and they ask. The first brick says: I was just doing what my job says to do. The second brick says the same. Every brick says the same. And every brick is telling the truth. None of them built the whole tower. All of them together are the tower.

The people who designed the tower knew this would happen. They built the tower this way on purpose. They knew that if every brick could see the whole tower and understand what it was for, some of the bricks would refuse to be part of it. So they built the tower out of bricks that can only see one brick.

This is called compartmentalization. It has been around for a very long time, one of the main ways big things get done in the world, whether the things are good or bad. And when the big thing turns out to be a bad thing, this is why there is nobody to be sorry for it and nobody to fix it. The bricks are all still there, still doing their jobs. The people who designed the tower are somewhere else, and the tower does what they built it to do. The child is still hurt.

In Print

Thirteen of my books are now available as paperbacks, printed to order through Lulu and shipped worldwide. The Unvaccinated lays out the completely unvaccinated as a comparison group across twenty chapters and five appendices — as far as I know, the only book of its kind. Medicalized Motherhood follows a woman through 123 documented interventions from teenage pill to postpartum discharge. Drilling for Profit argues that cavities, gum disease, and crooked teeth are a dietary problem the dental profession treats surgically. What Your Vet Can’t Tell You applies the same critique to pets — food, vaccines, and a profession trained by the industries whose products cause the harm. Escape from Psychiatry documents the fabrication of the DSM, the collapse of the serotonin hypothesis, and the specific damage done by every major psychiatric drug class.

Two go to the paradigm underneath the whole shelf. No Contagion, co-authored with Jamie Andrews, catalogues 258 failed contagion experiments and the case against germ theory itself. No Virus takes the examination one layer deeper — the isolation problem, the collapse of virology’s foundational claims, and a disease-by-disease reappraisal of the entities the framework is built on.

Four take on the remedies and paradigm questions mainstream medicine actively suppresses. The DMSO Book covers 100,000 studies, zero deaths, and one approval — the suppressed science of medicine’s most versatile compound. Chlorine Dioxide: The Forbidden Remedy collects the interviews, protocols, and evidence from the doctors and researchers they tried to silence. The Iodine Book recovers an essential mineral driven out of easy reach by bromide, fluoride, and perchlorate — and the pharmacological tradition that kept its therapeutic use alive across the decades mainstream medicine set it aside. The Hydrogen Peroxide Book recovers a century of practice with a compound the body already makes — mitochondrial, phagocytic, part of thyroid hormone synthesis — suppressed precisely because its clinical utility threatened the pharmaceutical direction that captured twentieth-century medicine.

Two more take on the remedies already in your kitchen. Baking Soda locates sodium bicarbonate inside the terrain framework industrial medicine buried — the compound already in your cupboard, and what it does at the level of the blood, kidneys, lungs, digestion, and skin. The Castor Oil Book recovers four thousand years of documented practice on the medicine mainstream healthcare quietly stopped talking about — the kitchen bottle that doesn’t sit well in a system built on prescriptions and procedures.

A physical book reaches the person a Substack post never will — the sceptical relative, the friend who won’t click a link but might open a book, the visitor whose eye lands on a coffee table. The full shelf is at lulu.com/spotlight/unbekoming. Buy one to keep, and one to give away.

References

1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Recommended Child and Adolescent Immunization Schedule for Ages 18 Years or Younger, United States, current edition, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/schedules/hcp/imz/child-adolescent.html.

2. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011).

3. Congressional Research Service, “The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP),” CRS In Focus IF12317, updated September 15, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12317; CDC, “Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices Charter,” https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/acip/committee/charter.html.

4. “Royalty Pharma Acquires Rights to Rotavirus Vaccine,” Modern Healthcare, April 24, 2008; Merck & Co., Form 10-K for FY 2007 (RotaTeq approval, February 2006, and worldwide sales); public disclosures of Paul Offit’s inventor status and royalty share.

5. Prescription Drug User Fee Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 379g-379h; parallel biologics and generics user fee statutes.

6. Informed Consent Action Network, correspondence with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services regarding pre-licensure clinical safety trials for childhood vaccines, 2018-2019, https://icandecide.org.

7. Jeffrey Bien and Vinay Prasad, “Future Jobs of FDA’s Haematology-Oncology Reviewers,” BMJ 354 (September 27, 2016): i5055, https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.i5055.

8. Paul D. Thacker, “Covid-19: Researcher Blows the Whistle on Data Integrity Issues in Pfizer’s Vaccine Trial,” BMJ 375 (November 2, 2021): n2635.

9. National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 et seq.

10. 26 U.S.C. § 4131 (imposition of tax); IRS Publication 510, “Excise Taxes”; the tax is $0.75 per dose per taxable vaccine, with combination vaccines taxed as the sum of their components.

11. Health Resources and Services Administration, “National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program Data & Statistics,” January 2026 report; https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/data.

12. Children’s Health Defense, “CDC Recommended Vaccine Schedule 1986 vs. 2019,” summarizing the pre-NCVIA schedule; contemporary CDC schedule archives.

13. Wyeth and Connaught cited the inability to procure affordable liability insurance in withdrawing from the DPT market in 1984 (Washington Post, June 19, 1984; New York Times, December 12, 1984); Lederle became the sole remaining major domestic DPT producer and encountered production and insurance difficulties in 1984.

14. Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d.

15. Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e.

16. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, “Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements,” draft August 1997, finalized August 1999.

17. Sharyl Attkisson, Stonewalled: My Fight for Truth Against the Forces of Obstruction, Intimidation, and Harassment in Obama’s Washington (New York: HarperCollins, November 2014).

18. Matt Taibbi, Michael Shellenberger, and Bari Weiss, “The Twitter Files,” serial publication beginning December 2, 2022, https://www.racket.news and https://www.thefp.com.

19. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776), Book I, Chapter I.

20. Kate Moore, The Radium Girls: The Dark Story of America’s Shining Women (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, 2017).

21. Alice Hamilton, Exploring the Dangerous Trades: The Autobiography of Alice Hamilton, M.D. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943).

22. James H. Jones, Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, revised edition (New York: Free Press, 1993).

23. The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979).

24. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986).

25. Richard P. Feynman, “Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman!” Adventures of a Curious Character (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985).