Institutional Translation

An Essay by Luc Lelièvre

The Parti Québécois won 59 of 127 seats on October 5, enough to form a minority government and to launch États généraux on education within its first 100 days. The policy agenda is set. What happens next depends less on the agenda itself than on the institutions that must translate it into daily practice. Those institutions were not designed to oppose the government. They were designed to administer, and administration has a logic of its own.

Institutional translation is Luc’s name for what happens when a political mandate is interpreted, operationalized, and incorporated into existing routines by actors who each believe they are implementing it responsibly. The language of the original commitment survives; its operational meaning shifts. Translation is not a seventh Closure mechanism. It is a process through which a mandate changes as it moves through the system, and depending on circumstances it may facilitate Neutralization, Dilution, Reversal, or Enantiodromia. The distinction matters because a diagnosis is only useful if it names how the failure occurs.

The États généraux are the test. Luc identifies three conditions that separate consultation from correction: disagreement must stay visible rather than get smoothed into consensus; responsibility must stay traceable across institutional boundaries; and outcomes must be able to override procedures when the evidence demands it. If those conditions hold, political change becomes institutional learning. If they do not, the reform is implemented in name while the underlying arrangement stays intact. Quebec will show, in the open, which it is.

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Institutional Translation

Agonistic Governance and Institutional Fragmentation in Quebec

An Essay by Luc Lelièvre

From Electoral Change to Institutional Change

Quebec’s October 5, 2026, election marked a significant political shift. The Parti Québécois returned to power after more than a decade, winning 59 of the National Assembly’s 127 seats---enough to form a minority government but not enough to govern without negotiation. The result gives the new government a mandate to pursue its program but not control over the institutional system through which that program must pass.

This distinction matters. Elections can replace governments quickly, but they cannot instantly replace the administrative routines, professional jurisdictions, regulations, budgetary commitments, organizational interests, and institutional memories accumulated over many years. A political program enters an environment whose procedures were not necessarily designed to support its objectives. Those procedures may be indispensable for continuity and accountability, yet they can also shape, narrow, or redirect the new government’s agenda.

Education offers a particularly useful case. Before the election, the Parti Québécois announced five major education initiatives and promised to launch États généraux on the future of education within its first 100 days in government. The five areas include vocational education and dropout prevention; Quebec culture; physical activity; civility and school violence; and social and socioeconomic mixing.

These are political commitments, not completed reforms. Their significance lies in what happens next: how the broad objectives are interpreted, translated into administrative requirements, implemented across institutions, and evaluated against their intended outcomes.

The coming process, therefore, offers an opportunity to examine a problem I call agonistic governance. The central question is not simply whether the new government has chosen the right policies. It is whether the institutional structure through which those policies must pass can coordinate dispersed knowledge, preserve accountability, and self-correct when implementation produces unanticipated consequences.

The argument is not that institutions consciously conspire against political change. Rather, it is that separate institutions can act rationally within their mandates, yet their combined actions frustrate the objectives they are expected to serve. Political change may occur at the governmental level, yet the institutional logic that shapes its implementation remains largely intact.

What Is Agonistic Governance?

Ministries, public agencies, universities, professional orders, courts, tribunals, health-care institutions, commissions, school service centers, and regulatory bodies exercise authority within their respective jurisdictions. Each has its own mandate, procedures, professional standards, and criteria for determining whether it has fulfilled its responsibilities. Specialization is necessary in a complex society. The difficulty arises when a situation that is continuous for an individual is divided among separate administrative units.

A student’s difficulty, for example, may involve classroom instruction, family circumstances, mental health, language, school resources, and social conditions. Each dimension may fall under a different professional or administrative responsibility. The student experiences one situation; the institutional system encounters several files. Each file may be handled competently, yet the relationships among them may remain unexamined.

This is a form of horizontal fragmentation. Institutions do not necessarily compete with one another. They may lack a common field where the combined consequences of their actions can be recognized and addressed. One authority applies its mandate; another follows its own rules; a third reviews a narrower question. Each decision may be defensible in isolation, yet the overall outcome remains unsatisfactory.

Agonistic governance describes this structural production of conflict. The term refers neither to deliberate hostility nor to ordinary political disagreement. It denotes a condition in which distinct institutional logics interact without a reliable mechanism to reconcile their consequences. The resulting conflict may be experienced by citizens as contradictory instructions, repeated assessments, untraceable responsibility, or a process in which every office can explain what it has done but no one can explain why the overall result has failed.

The distinction between intention and outcome is essential. Institutions need not be malicious to cause harm. Their actions may be internally coherent and professionally defensible. The problem is systemic: coordinating separate mandates does not automatically produce a coherent response to a problem that spans institutional boundaries.

Friedrich Hayek’s knowledge problem helps explain why this matters. The knowledge required for social coordination is dispersed among individuals and embedded in specific times and places. No central authority possesses it all. Even when relevant information exists within a bureaucratic system, it may not reach the actors who can use it, or it may be interpreted through categories that prevent it from changing decisions.

The issue is therefore not merely whether the government collects enough information. It is whether the institutional structure can bring different forms of knowledge into a common field of responsibility and enable that knowledge to change what institutions do.

When Responsibility Falls Between Institutions

When responsibility is divided among several authorities, individuals may be asked to follow one procedure and then another. One authority explains that the matter falls outside its jurisdiction. Another agrees to consider only a narrower aspect. A third may have the power to review a decision but not to examine the circumstances that produced it. The person concerned is left to navigate the boundaries between organizations, each of which may be following its rules correctly.

This fragmentation has consequences beyond inconvenience. It can make it difficult to pinpoint responsibility. If each institution is assessed based on whether it has followed its assigned procedure, a failure caused by the interaction of several procedures may not appear in any institution’s internal records as its own failure. Each body can document compliance, while the system as a whole fails to achieve the objective for which it exists.

Bureaucratic organizations do not face the same continuous test as entrepreneurial firms. Markets provide decentralized signals through prices, profits and losses, competition, entry and exit, and shifting consumer choices. These signals are imperfect and do not guarantee good decisions, but they can reveal when resources are being used in ways that people do not value. Bureaucracies operate under different conditions. Their performance is commonly evaluated based on rules, budgets, staffing, legal compliance, reporting requirements, and the completion of assigned tasks.

Such measures can be necessary, but they do not always indicate whether the combined consequences of administrative activity serve the underlying social objective. An agency may meet its deadlines, follow its regulations, and close its files, while the people affected by its decisions continue to face the original problem.

An institution also has reasons to protect confidence in its procedures. Acknowledging an isolated error may be manageable, but acknowledging a systemic failure raises questions about the organization’s categories, responsibilities, and operating assumptions.

Institutional self-protection does not always take the form of explicit denial. A problem may instead be transferred, narrowed, referred for review, or broken into smaller questions. Each step can be procedurally legitimate; together, they can make the original contradiction harder to resolve.

The result may appear as administrative activity rather than as a failure. More reviews are conducted, more reports are produced, more committees are convened, and responsibility is distributed. The system becomes busier without necessarily becoming more capable of correcting the issue.

Disagreement as Information

A system fragmented across mandates also needs a way to recognize information that challenges its established interpretation. Disagreement can be one such source.

Norman R. F. Maier and L. Richard Hoffman examined how leaders’ attitudes toward disagreement affect group problem solving. Their work suggests that disagreement can either provoke defensiveness or lead to more innovative solutions, depending on how leaders interpret it. When dissenting participants are treated as “problem employees,” the quality and acceptance of solutions can suffer; when disagreement is treated as a source of ideas, it can improve problem solving.

The relevance to agonistic governance is direct. A contradiction between institutional perspectives is not automatically a sign of dysfunction. It may indicate that the problem has been defined too narrowly, that important knowledge is missing, or that a procedure produces consequences invisible within a single mandate. Disagreement becomes dysfunctional when the system loses the capacity to treat contradiction as information.

This matters for the proposed États généraux. A consultation that seeks only agreement may conceal rather than resolve the differences that matter. If participants are encouraged to express concerns but the resulting contradictions are translated into consensus language, the process may appear successful while losing some of its most valuable information.

The objective should not be to preserve disagreement for its own sake. It should be to ensure that disagreement identifies assumptions, exposes trade-offs, and changes decisions when the evidence warrants it.

The decisive question is not whether the government listens. It is whether what it hears can influence what institutions do afterward. Consultation becomes institutionally meaningful only when participants can trace a link between the information they provide and the decisions that follow.

Reforming the Machinery That Must Implement Reform

The new government has announced education initiatives and promised to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy and administrative burdens. Yet the machinery through which reform must be implemented is the very machinery that has accumulated the procedures and categories now under reconsideration. The government must use existing institutions to change how those institutions operate.

This creates a structural paradox. A government announces that administrative burdens should be reduced. A ministry must determine what counts as an unnecessary burden. Administrators develop criteria; departments report progress; agencies demonstrate compliance; and new guidelines may be issued to simplify existing ones. The reform can generate additional administrative activity in the name of reducing it.

No bad faith is required. Every participant may be acting rationally within their assigned responsibilities. The paradox arises from the interaction among those responsibilities and from the difficulty of changing procedures through procedures that embody the existing institutional logic.

The problem is not simply that political leaders lack authority. Rather, an institution’s categories determine what can readily be recognized, measured, funded, reported, and administered. What does not fit those categories requires interpretation, an exemption, or another procedure. A reform may therefore be implemented successfully within the administrative system’s own logic, even as its original purpose is weakened along the way.

This is harder to identify than open resistance. No institution needs to defy the government, and no administrator needs to announce opposition. The original proposal may retain its name, appear in official plans, and be recorded as implemented. Yet its practical meaning can shift as it moves through successive stages of interpretation and operationalization.

The question is whether the administrative system can revise its own procedures in light of what implementation reveals---or whether it can revise them only to manage the consequences of the existing procedures.

Consultation, Translation, and the Mutation of a Political Mandate

The five education initiatives announced by the Parti Québécois appear straightforward politically: strengthen vocational education and combat dropout rates; increase the role of Quebec culture; promote physical activity; reinforce civility and address school violence; and encourage greater social and socioeconomic mixing. But each objective must be translated into institutional rules before it can affect daily practice.

What counts as vocational preparation? How is dropout measured? Which works are included in a common cultural curriculum, and who selects them? How should 60 minutes of daily physical activity be integrated into school schedules? What constitutes violence serious enough to trigger a sanction, and who determines the appropriate response? How can school financing be adjusted without creating additional administrative complications? What precisely constitutes adequate social or socioeconomic mixing?

These questions do not invalidate the political objectives. They show that political commitments and institutional outcomes are not the same. A government can set a direction, but it cannot fully determine the chain of consequences that follows when multiple organizations interpret and implement it.

A mandate passes through several stages. Political leaders define an objective; ministries interpret it; administrators operationalize it; professionals apply it in specific settings; institutions establish procedures; interest groups respond; and regulations and exceptions emerge. The final policy may preserve the original commitment’s vocabulary while altering its practical effect. The result need not be deliberate obstruction. It can arise from the accumulated decisions of actors who each believe they are implementing the mandate responsibly.

For this reason, I would describe the process as institutional translation rather than Neutralization. Translation can dilute or redirect a political objective without suppressing dissent or openly opposing the government. The process may retain the language of reform even as its operational meaning shifts. It is therefore distinct from Neutralization, as defined in the Closure series, in which a corrective signal is prevented from acquiring institutional force. The two can reinforce each other, however: translation may weaken a mandate, while the subsequent marginalization of criticism can prevent the resulting mismatch from being corrected.

This distinction also situates the essay within the broader conceptual framework developed throughout the Closure series. The six mechanisms are related but not interchangeable. Neutralization prevents a corrective signal from gaining institutional force; Dilution disperses its significance across procedures, actors, or jurisdictions; Suspension delays the moment when a response becomes unavoidable; Reversal turns a corrective signal against its source; Rogueness describes institutional actors or subsystems that increasingly escape corrective constraints; and Enantiodromia names the possibility that a response, pushed to an extreme, produces the opposite of its stated purpose.

Institutional translation is not a seventh synonym for these mechanisms. It is a process in which a political mandate changes as it moves through the institutional system. Depending on the circumstances, that process may contribute to Dilution, facilitate Neutralization, or produce outcomes resembling Reversal or Enantiodromia. The distinctions matter because a diagnosis is useful only if it identifies how the failure occurs, rather than treating every institutional disappointment as the same mechanism.

The five chantiers therefore offer an opportunity to observe how a political mandate evolves during implementation. The question is not whether every proposal survives intact.

A genuinely learning system must be able to revise, combine, or abandon proposals when experience shows they do not work as intended. The question is whether those changes stem from visible learning and accountable decisions, or whether the original objectives are gradually eroded by the routines used to administer them.

A Simple Proposal, a Complex Institution

The proposed sixty minutes of daily physical activity offers a concrete illustration of the translation problem. As a political objective, the proposal is easy to understand. However, its implementation immediately raises questions about school schedules, staffing, facilities, weather, student needs, curricular priorities, and the resources available to different schools.

Someone must decide whether activity occurs during existing classes, recess, physical education, or a newly organized period. Someone must also determine how compliance will be recorded and how differences among schools will be accommodated.

These are legitimate questions. They are not evidence that the proposal is misguided. They reveal the gap between stating an objective and organizing the conditions needed to achieve it.

The risk is that the easiest elements to administer may gradually displace the underlying purpose. If compliance is measured by the number of minutes formally scheduled, the system may document activity without determining whether students are actually more active.

If schools must meet a uniform standard despite differing facilities or needs, the administrative requirement may take precedence over the outcome. If reporting requirements become the primary evidence of success, the system may learn to demonstrate compliance rather than to evaluate consequences.

This example clarifies why the translation process must be assessed empirically rather than presumed to be either good or bad. Administrative specification is unavoidable. A broad political objective cannot be implemented without decisions on resources, responsibilities, and standards.

Translation becomes problematic when the measures introduced to achieve the objective begin to supplant the objective itself, or when evidence of unintended consequences fails to prompt a revision of the procedure.

The same questions apply to vocational education, cultural programming, school safety, and social mixing. In each case, the political mandate must be implemented. The challenge is to maintain a clear connection among the original purpose, the adopted procedures, and the outcomes for students and educators.

The Minority Government Problem

The PQ’s minority position adds another layer to this problem. With 59 of 127 seats, the government must negotiate legislation and budgets with opposition parties. As a result, the political process is horizontally fragmented across parties and parliamentary institutions. Meanwhile, implementation is vertically divided among ministries, agencies, school service centers, schools, professional groups, and local administrators.

These forms of fragmentation are distinct, yet they can interact. A political proposal may be modified during parliamentary negotiations and then further interpreted during administrative implementation.

If the final outcome departs from the original commitment, it may be difficult to determine which stage produced the decisive change. Responsibility can become diffuse not because no one made decisions, but because decisions are distributed across a chain in which no actor controls the entire process.

A minority government can also create opportunities for more deliberation and compromise. The argument is not that minority status necessarily weakens reform. Negotiation may expose assumptions, improve proposals, or reveal concerns that a majority government might otherwise overlook. The issue is whether the resulting compromises remain intelligible and accountable and whether the administrative stage preserves the capacity to learn from them.

The PQ’s situation is therefore a useful test case. The government may know what it wants to achieve, but a political mandate alone does not guarantee that the institutional system can deliver the intended outcome. The outcome depends on the interplay among political bargaining, administrative interpretation, professional knowledge, and the procedures for evaluating performance.

The Education System as a Discovery Problem

The most useful question raised by the education program is not whether each proposal is desirable in the abstract. Some may prove effective; others may require modification or lead to unintended consequences.

That is normal. A policy is a hypothesis about how a set of actions will affect a complex reality. Its implementation should therefore generate information for assessing and revising the policy.

Markets provide a decentralized discovery process through prices, profits and losses, competition, entry and exit, and changing circumstances. Bureaucratic institutions operate under different incentives. Their signals are often procedural: compliance, reporting, budgetary performance, legal conformity, and completion of assigned tasks. These indicators can tell an organization whether it has followed the procedure, but they do not necessarily show whether the procedure has achieved the intended social outcome.

A school can adopt a new curriculum. A ministry can demonstrate that the curriculum has been implemented. Administrators can complete the required reports. A government can announce that the reform has been delivered. Students may still be no better off.

If the system measures implementation more reliably than consequences, it can become more successful by its internal indicators while becoming less successful in the reality those indicators were supposed to measure.

This is not an argument that education should be run as a business or that market signals can replace all public responsibilities. It is an argument about discovery and correction. Any institution needs ways to identify when its decisions fail to meet its objectives.

Market processes are one source of feedback; professional judgment, student outcomes, parental experience, independent evaluation, and public scrutiny are others. The institutional question is whether such feedback can influence policy rather than being confined to reports.

A learning system must also distinguish between a policy’s failure and the failure of the conditions under which it was implemented. Sometimes a proposal is poorly designed. Sometimes it is sound but under-resourced. Sometimes its benefits emerge only after a longer period. Sometimes it imposes unanticipated costs.

These possibilities require investigation rather than automatic defense or automatic rejection.

The discovery problem is therefore inseparable from institutional accountability. If responsibility is traceable and outcomes can override procedures, a reform can be adjusted in light of experience. If responsibility is diffuse and compliance is treated as proof of success, the institution may continue to reproduce a policy even after its limitations become apparent.

The Real Test of the États généraux

The proposed États généraux should not be judged primarily by the number of participants, consultations, submissions, or reports they generate. Those measures may indicate activity, but they do not prove that institutional learning has occurred. The more demanding test is whether the process changes what institutions do afterward.

Three conditions are especially important.

First, disagreement must remain visible. Participants should be able to identify contradictions and challenge assumptions without their concerns being prematurely framed as part of the consensus. The point is not to prevent agreement but to ensure that agreement does not become a substitute for examining inconvenient evidence.

Second, responsibility must remain traceable. When several institutions contribute to implementing a policy, it should still be possible to determine who is responsible for specific decisions and who has the authority to revise them. Distributed expertise does not require responsibility to be untraceable.

Third, outcomes must be able to override procedures. If evidence shows that a policy produces unintended consequences, the system must be able to modify the policy or its implementation rather than merely document the discrepancy. The process should not assume a procedure is successful simply because it has been followed.

These conditions offer a practical way to distinguish consultation from correction. A consultation can gather extensive information while leaving the original institutional arrangements unchanged. It can also expose contradictions, assign responsibility, and create a path for revising decisions. The difference lies not in how much information is collected, but in whether that information has consequences.

The États généraux would therefore be significant if they established a durable process through which teachers, parents, students, administrators, researchers, and policymakers could contribute their diverse forms of knowledge to decisions that remain open to revision.

Their value would not depend on preserving all five chantiers exactly as originally announced. On the contrary, a process capable of learning must allow proposals to be modified, combined, or abandoned when the evidence warrants it.

The question is simple to state: does new information change institutional behavior? The answer depends on whether the consultation is intended to influence decisions or merely to demonstrate that consultation has taken place.

Political Change and Institutional Persistence

A new government can replace ministers in a matter of days, but it cannot change institutional memory at the same pace. Political decisions are discontinuous; institutions are cumulative. The government arrives with a program, while the administrative system receives it through categories and procedures inherited from earlier periods. These categories determine what can be readily recognized, measured, funded, reported, and administered.

The danger is not that the bureaucracy will consciously sabotage the elected government. A more subtle possibility is that it will implement the reform in accordance with its established logic. The proposal retains its official name, the relevant procedures are adopted, and the required reports are completed. Yet the original objective becomes difficult to distinguish from the administrative machinery created in its name.

This is why institutional translation matters. Political change is real, but its effects are mediated by a system with its own routines, incentives, boundaries, and criteria for success. The question is whether the system can revise those arrangements when their consequences diverge from the intended outcome.

The same distinction explains why administrative reform can be especially difficult. A government seeking to reduce unnecessary procedures must rely on institutions that use procedures to organize their work and demonstrate accountability. Some procedures are essential; others may have accumulated because earlier procedures failed or because each new problem was addressed by adding another requirement.

Simplification cannot be achieved merely by announcing a reduction. It requires identifying which procedures serve an indispensable function, which merely reproduce administrative habits, and which obscure the effects of institutional decisions.

The first hundred days are therefore an opportunity, not a guarantee. They can set the terms of a learning process, but they cannot, by themselves, transform institutional habits. The meaningful measure of progress will be whether the government creates conditions in which contradictory evidence can be considered, responsibility can be assigned, and procedures can be revised without each revision adding another layer of administration.

Conclusion: From Political Mandate to Institutional Learning

Quebec’s new education agenda offers an early opportunity to examine the relationship between electoral and institutional change. The Parti Québécois has a political mandate and a set of announced objectives. What remains uncertain is how those objectives will be interpreted and implemented by institutions whose mandates, procedures, and internal measures of success were developed over time.

Agonistic governance captures the difficulty that arises when institutions operate across separate jurisdictions without an effective way to reconcile the consequences of their actions. The problem is not necessarily open conflict or deliberate obstruction. Institutional coherence within each organization can coexist with incoherence at the system level.

Institutional translation is a process through which that gap can widen. A political mandate is interpreted, operationalized, and incorporated into existing routines. This is unavoidable and can be constructive.

It becomes problematic when the language of the original commitment persists even as its intended effects are diluted or redirected, and when the resulting mismatch cannot be corrected. This process must be distinguished from Neutralization, as defined in the Closure series, although the mechanisms can reinforce each other.

The États généraux will matter only if they do more than add another consultation to the existing administrative structure. Their value will depend on whether they bring dispersed knowledge into a common field of responsibility, preserve disagreement as a source of information, and allow observed outcomes to revise policies and procedures adopted in advance.

If they do, the process may help translate political change into institutional learning. If they do not, the reform may be formally implemented even though the underlying problem remains unchanged.

Institutions need not be enemies fighting one another. They need only become sufficiently fragmented so that each protects the coherence of its mandate, while the system as a whole loses the ability to recognize the consequences of its separate actions. The real test of Quebec’s education reform is whether its institutions can learn to see those consequences together---and to change course when the evidence demands it.

Annotated MLA Bibliography

Hayek, F. A. “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” The American Economic Review, vol. 35, no. 4, 1945, pp. 519--530.

Hayek provides the essay’s principal theoretical foundation. His account of dispersed and contextual knowledge explains why no central authority can fully possess the information required for social coordination. Here, the argument is applied to the implementation of political mandates across multiple institutions: collecting information is insufficient unless the system can integrate it and revise decisions accordingly.

Lachance, Nicolas. “Le PQ imposerait 60 minutes d’activité physique par jour à l’école.” Le Journal de Québec, 2 Sept. 2026.

This article offers a concrete example of the implementation questions raised by the proposed daily physical-activity target. It helps distinguish a political objective from the organizational decisions required to carry it out, such as schedules, facilities, staffing, and evaluation.

Maier, Norman R. F., and L. Richard Hoffman. “Acceptance and Quality of Solutions as Related to Leaders’ Attitudes toward Disagreement in Group Problem Solving.” The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, vol. 1, no. 4, 1965, pp. 373--386.

Maier and Hoffman argue that disagreement can lead to better solutions when treated as information rather than as evidence of a problematic participant. Their work is relevant to the proposed États généraux because consultation is more likely to foster learning when it preserves meaningful disagreement rather than seeking premature consensus.

Mises, Ludwig von. Bureaucracy. Yale University Press, 1944.

Mises distinguishes bureaucratic management, organized around rules and assigned procedures, from entrepreneurial management, which operates under the discipline of economic calculation and profit and loss. His analysis helps explain why procedural compliance alone cannot determine whether an institution has achieved its underlying purpose. The essay does not claim that market mechanisms can replace all public responsibilities; rather, it uses the contrast to highlight a problem with feedback and correction.

Parti Québécois. “Un gouvernement du Parti Québécois lancera cinq grands chantiers en éducation.” Parti Québécois, 2 Sept. 2026, https://pq.org/nouvelles/un-gouvernement-du-parti-quebecois-lancera-cinq-grands-chantiers-en-education/.

This primary source documents the PQ’s announced education agenda before the election, including the five chantiers and the promise to launch the États généraux within the first 100 days of a PQ government. It is essential for distinguishing the party’s political commitments from policies already implemented.

“Résultats des élections générales du 5 octobre 2026.” Élections Québec, https://www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/resultats-et-statistiques/resultats-generales/2026-10-05/218/.

The official election results set the political context for the essay. The Parti Québécois won 59 seats, falling short of the 64 needed for a majority in the 127-seat National Assembly. This minority position makes parliamentary negotiation relevant to the analysis, but it does not, in itself, prove that reform will be obstructed.

“Le PQ veut une « mise à jour » du système d’éducation.” Le Devoir, 2 Sept. 2026.

This independent coverage places the PQ’s education proposals in the context of the election campaign. It offers a secondary perspective on the announced agenda and reinforces the distinction between electoral commitments and the eventual institutional form of reform.

In Print

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